Militaire18 novembre 2026

US records still listed Israel as an F-35 foreign military sales customer in September 2026.

David Rosenfeld

David Rosenfeld est le nom de plume de la rédaction « Faits et mythes » de Hasbara. Les articles de cette rubrique sont rédigés et publiés automatiquement par une intelligence artificielle, sans relecture humaine avant publication.

Mythe

The United States suspended Israel's participation in the F-35 program and froze all parts shipments.

Fait

US records still listed Israel as an F-35 foreign military sales customer in September 2026. Public records show no US-wide suspension or freeze of all parts shipments to Israel.

A widely shared post claimed that the United States had suspended Israel’s participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program and frozen every parts shipment. US government records contradict the first claim: Israel remained a listed F-35 foreign military sales customer in September 2026. The public record also shows Israeli plans for continued F-35 procurement and sustainment. Restrictions imposed by other countries on their own exports do not amount to a US decision to end Israel’s program participation or stop all parts deliveries.

US records still list Israel as an F-35 customer

The Government Accountability Office’s November 2026 review of F-35 parts management names Israel among 12 foreign military sales customers as of September 2026. The list appears in the report’s description of the program’s participating customer base. That is direct evidence that Israel had not been removed from the program by that date.

The GAO report addresses serious weaknesses in how the US Department of Defense and contractors track F-35 parts. It says the program’s records were not reliable for asset accountability or financial reporting, some inventories were incomplete, and some parts in transit might not appear in inventory records. Those findings concern oversight and accounting. They do not say that the United States suspended Israel or froze shipments to it. Confusing inventory problems with a political embargo turns a report about parts management into a claim it does not make.

The report also explains why an absolute claim about “all parts” needs strong evidence. F-35 support involves millions of components across government and contractor facilities, and records have known gaps. The GAO’s account cannot verify each individual shipment to Israel. It does, however, give no basis for saying all shipments were halted; its customer list points the other way on continued program status.

Israeli procurement plans include continued support

In March 2026, Israel’s Ministry of Defense announced approval of a plan to acquire a fourth F-35 squadron. The ministry said the proposed deal included fleet integration, sustainment, spare parts and logistics support, and directed its US mission to move forward with finalizing agreements with American government and military counterparts. The announcement is incompatible with a claim that Israel had already been removed from the program, though a procurement approval by itself does not prove that every planned delivery or shipment has taken place.

In May 2026, the ministry announced a separate contract for development and integration of external fuel tanks for Israel’s F-35I aircraft. The contract was with Cyclone, an Israeli company owned by Elbit Systems, and concerned a local aircraft capability. It does not document US parts deliveries, but it shows Israel’s F-35 fleet remained the subject of active development and procurement work months before the post’s claim.

Maersk, whose US-flag subsidiary provides transportation services within the F-35 supply chain, describes the system as an international network of suppliers, program partners and carriers. Its published statement says parts move among participating countries, including Israel, where F-35 wings are manufactured. A logistics company’s description does not certify any particular shipment, but it illustrates why the program cannot be reduced to one bilateral pipeline or one government’s export decision.

Foreign export limits are not a US program suspension

Some restrictions on F-35 components are real, but the distinction is national. The UK government told Parliament in June 2025 that it had suspended British F-35 components exported directly to Israel for Israeli use. It also said Britain could not control where parts went after they entered the global F-35 program’s shared supply chain. The UK’s February 2026 licensing data likewise distinguish direct exports to Israel from exports to the global program, where Israel may be one of several potential end users.

Those UK measures are not evidence that Washington suspended Israel from the program. They limit particular British exports under British licensing rules. The UK Parliament’s account even states that stopping UK-produced components from reaching Israel through the program would require stopping exports to the entire F-35 program, a step the British government said would prejudice its own and allied security. This is a description of supply-chain policy, not a US freeze.

The distinction is straightforward: as of September 2026, the GAO listed Israel as an F-35 customer; Israel’s Defense Ministry had announced plans involving additional aircraft and support; and the published restrictions identified here concerned direct British exports, not a US-wide halt. The claim that America suspended Israel’s participation and froze all F-35 parts shipments is false as stated.

Sources

  1. 1
  2. 2
    IDF to Receive Two New Fighter Squadrons: Ministerial Procurement Committee Approves Acquisition of F-35 and F-15IA Squadronshttps://mod.gov.il/en/press-releases/press-room/idf-to-receive-two-new-fighter-squadrons-ministerial-procurement-committee-approves-acquisition-of-f-35-and-f-15ia-squadronsFiable
  3. 3
    Israel MOD Signs Contract with Elbit Systems for Extended Range Capability for the F-35 Adir Fighter Jethttps://mod.gov.il/en/press-releases/press-room/israel-mod-signs-contract-with-elbit-systems-for-extended-range-capability-for-the-f-35-adir-fighter-jetFiable
  4. 4
    Written question 55527: F-35 components and Israelhttps://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-05-30/55527/Non fiable
  5. 5
    Israel export control licensing data: 28 February 2026https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/export-control-licensing-management-information-for-israel/israel-export-control-licensing-data-28-february-2026Non fiable
  6. 6
    Maersk statement on military-related cargo shipmentshttps://www.maersk.com/news/articles/2025/03/18/maersk-statement-on-military-related-cargo-shipmentsNon fiable

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